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and Research Needs from the
Literature
Aaron Cosbey*, Susanne Droege†, Carolyn Fischer‡, and
Clayton Munnings§
Introduction
Economists have long advocated carbon pricing as the most comprehensive and cost-
effective way to reduce global carbon1 emissions (e.g., Stern and Stiglitz 2017). However,
lacking a globally coordinated effort, many individual jurisdictions—including countries,
provinces, states, and cities—have unilaterally established carbon prices reflecting their in-
dividual capacities and policy contexts. Currently about 50 different initiatives worldwide
collectively price roughly 15 percent of annual global greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions
(World Bank and Ecofys 2018). Moreover, with the adoption of nationally determined
contributions (NDCs) by parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on
Climate Change (UNFCCC) and the 2016 Paris Agreement, international negotiations
have shifted more towards facilitating country-level efforts and away from prescriptive tar-
gets and mechanisms that could result in a global carbon price (van Asselt and Bobber 2016).
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The current landscape of divergent carbon prices with limited geographic coverage allows
scope for international trade to undermine the effectiveness of these carbon pricing regimes
through carbon leakage,2 adverse competitiveness impacts, and a lack of political support for
strong action (Droege et al. 2009). Thus jurisdictions that do price carbon frequently attach
measures to level the international playing field—for example, by offering free allocation of
emissions allowances to industries at risk of leakage.
Border carbon adjustment (BCA) is another tool for addressing carbon leakage. With BCA,
a country uses trade measures to put products from foreign producers who operate without a
carbon price on an even footing with products from domestic producers who do face a carbon
price. The rationale for BCA is to ensure that consumers face consistent prices regarding the
carbon content of the products they buy (Droege 2011). The idea is to levy a charge on
imported goods that is equivalent to the carbon payment that would have been made had
the goods been produced domestically. When combined with a domestic carbon tax, BCA
resembles the treatment of common consumption taxes, notably value-added taxes, which
apply only to domestically consumed goods. Such a BCA might also offer relief to exported
goods by rebating the associated domestic carbon payments, thus ensuring that domestic
exporters are not disadvantaged in international markets vis-a-vis competitors in jurisdic-
tions without carbon pricing. When combined instead with an emissions trading system
(ETS), a BCA could require domestic importers or foreign exporters of goods to buy emission
permits based on the amount of carbon emitted during production of the goods, imposing a
requirement analogous to that faced by domestic producers.
Although BCA is a tool that has largely remained inside the toolbox,3 it continues to be
proposed. For example, BCA was featured in (unsuccessful) U.S. climate legislation (e.g., the
American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2010, the American Opportunity Carbon Fee Act
of 2014), and BCA is a key component of the U.S. Climate Leadership Council’s current
proposal for a carbon taxation system (Baker et al. 2017). In the European Union (EU), the
attempted regulation of aviation-sector emissions resembled BCA, and a BCA for cement
imports was proposed for the EU ETS.4 Moreover, with the election of U.S. President Donald
Trump, and his stated intent to withdraw from the Paris Agreement, U.S. trading partners
have begun openly discussing carbon tariffs; for example, Mexico has mentioned BCA in its
NDCs (Davenport 2016). Finally, prominent economists and political scientists have pro-
posed using trade measures to support carbon pricing “climate clubs” (e.g., Victor 2011, 245;
Gollier and Tirole 2015; Nordhaus 2015).
While the concept of BCA is straightforward and intuitively appealing—that is, shifting
toward consumption-based carbon pricing—its design and implementation is quite chal-
lenging in practice. In particular, a policymaker crafting BCA provisions must make numer-
ous, complicated regulatory choices, including the BCA’s scope of applicability (i.e., which
policies, goods, sectors, countries), the methodology for assessing the carbon content of
2We define carbon leakage as occurring when the implementation of a climate policy (particularly carbon
pricing) in one jurisdiction leads to increased emissions in other jurisdictions. It is distinct from the broader
concept of global trade in embodied carbon, where carbon-intensive production tends to shift toward
developing countries and return as imports to industrialized countries (Peters et al. 2011).
3A form of BCA is currently playing a role in California’s ETS, designed to prevent the shift of electricity
production to dirtier out-of-state generators.
4The European Parliament rejected this amendment in February 2017.
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products, the type and price of the adjustment, scenarios requiring modification, and how the
resulting revenues will be used. Each of these choices has economic and environmental
implications that influence the effectiveness of the BCA, as well as nuanced technical, legal,
and political consequences that must also be considered.
This article reviews the economic and legal literature on BCA and, based on this review,
distills guidance for the design and implementation of effective and legally sound BCA. The
next two sections present background on the economics of carbon leakage and the relevant
legal context. Then we provide guidance regarding the key design choices for BCA and discuss
remaining gaps in the literature concerning these choices. The final section summarizes and
suggests future research.
The Economics of Carbon Leakage
Policy-induced carbon leakage concerns policymakers because it undermines the objective of
a domestic climate policy—reducing global GHG emissions—and raises the level of effort
and costs of achieving the intended abatement goal. The economics literature has identified
several channels for carbon leakage, attempted to quantify leakage rates, and examined the
potential for BCA to reduce leakage.
Channels for Leakage
The literature identifies at least four channels through which carbon can leak (Droege et al.
2009). Understanding each channel is important for both interpreting empirical studies of
leakage (which do not always capture all channels) and evaluating antileakage policies.
The first and most politically sensitive channel—and the one that is targeted by BCA—is
the competitiveness channel. Carbon pricing raises the costs of producing goods in the imple-
menting jurisdiction, which potentially puts foreign goods at a comparative advantage.
Consumers and producers may respond by substituting away from domestic products to-
ward cheaper foreign ones, causing both a loss of market share and lower profits for domestic
producers. As a result, production and emissions increase outside the implementing juris-
diction (Fischer and Fox 2012b). In the longer run, investment may also shift toward foreign
production, due to differences in the returns on capital associated with carbon pricing—and
possibly leading to the relocation of existing or planned production capacity.
Second is the energy market channel. Most carbon emissions stem from the burning of fossil
fuels. Reducing demand for fossil fuels in regulated regions drives down the world price of fossil
fuels, which in turn increases fuel consumption and carbon emissions in nonregulated parts of
the world. This channel is often found to be both the main driver of carbon leakage overall (e.g.,
Branger and Quirion 2014a) and the most difficult to address without global carbon pricing.
The income channel recognizes that the cost of abatement measures and the change in
relative prices triggered by the introduction of carbon pricing can cause significant changes in
the terms of trade, which in turn affects global income distribution. The resulting changes in
consumption patterns could, in theory, raise or lower foreign emissions (Karp 2013). Similar
indirect effects on output can occur if changes in input demand in the regulated region drive
up wages and the prices of cleaner inputs, potentially lowering the nonregulated region’s
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output and emissions (Baylis, Fullerton, and Karney 2014). By their nature, however, income
channel effects are secondary and unlikely to offset much of the direct effects of the compet-
itiveness and energy channels (Carbone 2013; Winchester and Rausch 2013).
The technology spillovers channel also raises the possibility of negative leakage (i.e., lower
foreign emissions). In this case, carbon pricing in the implementing jurisdiction induces
innovation in “green” technologies, which “spill over” to nonregulated regions and induce
emissions reductions (Barker et al. 2007; Gerlagh and Kuik 2014; Fischer 2016). The least is
known about this channel because technology spillovers play out in the longer term and good
empirical evidence for predicting them is lacking.
Quantifying leakage
To assess the scope of the carbon leakage problem, we review the literature on leakage rates—
measured as the increase in foreign emissions as a share of reductions in domestic emissions.
Many studies rely on ex ante numerical simulations using computable general equilibrium
(CGE) models, which capture interindustry and international relationships over the medium
to long run (Carbone and Rivers 2017). In the absence of antileakage policies, central esti-
mates of leakage rates for industrialized countries fall between 5 percent and 30 percent
(Böhringer, Balestreri and Rutherford 2012). Results indicate that only a small number of
industries have high leakage rates under economy-wide carbon pricing (e.g., Morgenstern
et al. 2004; Fischer and Fox 2012b).
Partial equilibrium (PE) models have been used extensively to examine “energy-intensive
and trade-exposed” (EITE) industries, including cement, aluminum, and steel and iron
production. These studies estimate leakage rates that range from 8 percent (Demailly and
Quirion 2008) to 90 percent (Chen 2009) in scenarios excluding measures to mitigate leakage.
In the EU, leakage rate predictions for EITE sectors are in the middle of the range—20–73
percent for the cement sector (Demailly and Quirion 2006, 2008; Ponssard and Walker
2008)—and approximately 30 percent and 50 percent, respectively, for the aluminum and
steel sectors (Demailly and Quirion 2008).
A smaller literature has drawn on recent experience to extrapolate leakage effects from
carbon pricing. Dechezlepretre and Sato (2017) recently reviewed these ex post studies. They
found that competitiveness effects of environmental regulations and energy price differentials
can be documented, but the effects tend to be small relative to those of other determinants of
trade (e.g., infrastructure, geography, availability of raw materials, and skilled labor) and are
often mitigated by innovation activity. A challenge for ex post evaluations is the lack of carbon
pricing at levels (or timescales) that would actually induce leakage. The gaps between ex ante
and ex post leakage estimates, as well as between the perceptions and estimates of leakage risk,
suggest a need for further research.
Effectiveness of BCA in Reducing Carbon Leakage
BCA cannot completely eliminate leakage, foremost because it only addresses the competi-
tiveness channel. Furthermore, economic theory suggests that tariffs alter the terms of trade,
which can undo their effects on foreign emissions (Markusen 1975). However, while
simple two-sector, two-country models indicate limitations to the effectiveness of BCA
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(e.g., Jakob, Marschinski, and Hübler 2013), detailed numerical analyses using multisector,
multiregion models consistently find significant potential for BCA to reduce leakage rates.
For example, in a summary of the results from twelve CGE models,5 Böhringer, Balistreri,
and Rutherford (2012) find that BCA reduces leakage rates by about one-third (from a mean
of 12 percent to 8 percent). One model incorporating the competitive selection of heteroge-
neous firms (following the new trade theory of Melitz [2003]) finds substantially higher
leakage rates and greater effectiveness of BCA (Balistreri and Rutherford 2012). Branger
and Quirion (2014b) performed a meta-analysis of 35 ex ante studies and found that BCA
reduced estimated leakage rates from a mean of 14 percent to 8 percent. They also found that
extending the BCA to all sectors (rather than applying it to EITE sectors only) and border-
adjusting exports further reduce leakage.
By passing carbon costs through to consumers, BCA tends to be more cost effective than
other unilateral options such as targeting vulnerable EITE sectors with exemptions
(Böhringer, Carbone, and Rutherford 2012) or output-based allocations (Fischer and Fox
2012b). However, BCA is not a panacea for EITE industries, because they may use carbon-
intensive intermediate inputs from nonregulated regions or face weaker domestic demand
from rising prices (Böhringer, Carbone, and Rutherford 2018; Burniaux, Chateau, and Duval
2013). Furthermore, by changing the terms of trade, BCA shifts more of the climate policy
burden toward developing countries (Böhringer, Fischer, and Rosendahl 2010). These ques-
tions concerning effectiveness and distributional effects are not only of economic conse-
quence, they are also relevant for the legality of BCA.
The Legal Context
Any discussion of best practices for BCA must also consider international law. The principle
of common but differentiated responsibilities (CBDR) and respective capabilities, under
which stronger actions are expected from developed than developing countries, is crucial
to UNFCCC negotiations. Moreover, World Trade Organization (WTO) agreements impose
legal constraints on trade measures. We next explore key legal concepts and commitments as
they relate to BCA design.
BCA as a Border Tax Adjustment
If BCA is implemented in conjunction with a carbon tax, then under trade law, it would be
considered a border tax adjustment (BTA), which is explicitly allowed if it meets certain
criteria. First among these is passing the like products test, which is about determining the
nature and extent of the competitive relationship between the imported and domestic
products.6 The determination of likeness takes into account (inter alia) the physical prop-
erties of the two goods, the tariff classifications of the two goods, the goods’ end uses,
and consumer preferences toward the goods.7 BTA is allowed for like goods, but it must
also meet General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) requirements concerning
5The model comparison exercise was organized by the Stanford Energy Modeling Forum (EMF).
6See GATT Article III and US – Clove Cigarettes (AB), paras. 103–120.
7See EU – Asbestos (AB), para. 101.
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national treatment.8 This first principle of nondiscrimination effectively mandates that any
adjustments to imported goods cannot result in treatment that is less favorable than the
treatment of like goods produced domestically. Would penalizing carbon-intensive
imports more heavily than clean domestic goods violate national treatment? WTO case
law appears to suggest that such differential treatment would be legal if based purely on
carbon content rather than the goods’ country of origin (Pauwelyn 2013); however, there is
no consensus on this issue (Holzer 2014; Trachtman 2017). A BCA regime may then be
judged to treat imported goods less favorably in order to protect domestic producers, in
which case its legality would rest on meeting GATT’s General Exceptions (discussed later).
BCA as Regulation
The law generally treats regulations differently than taxes, even if both amount to emissions
prices. If the BCA is implemented alongside an ETS (e.g., requiring that importers purchase
allowances equivalent to what the ETS requires of domestic producers), it would almost
certainly be covered as a form of domestic regulation under GATT,9 which requires that
the imported product receive regulatory treatment no less favorable than the like domestic
product. This means, for example, that foreign producers may not be required to have
emissions third-party verified when domestic producers do not, and that baseline emissions
for imports may not be more onerous than for like domestic goods. A BCA found to dis-
criminate against imported products could only be implemented if it meets the GATT
exceptions requirements.
Most-Favored Nation Treatment
With either a carbon tax or an ETS, BCA must also adhere to the most-favored nation (MFN)
principle,10 which prohibits discrimination between like products on the basis of the country
of origin. A BCA may conflict with this second GATT principle of nondiscrimination if it calls
for special treatment for some countries (e.g., less developed countries [LDCs], signatories to
a certain treaty). Similarly, differences in the assumed levels of embodied carbon in imports
that are based on variables specific to the country of export—as opposed to the individual
producer—could also be seen as violating MFN (Pauwelyn 2013). Some forms of discrim-
ination that favor LDCs are allowed under the WTO’s Enabling Clause,11 but only those
explicitly aimed at aiding development in the beneficiary countries, which is not the mandate
of BCA.
GATT Exceptions and Chapeau
Violations of the GATT principles of nondiscrimination are permitted under exceptional
circumstances laid out in Article XX; its clauses may pose the ultimate legal test for BCA. The
two most relevant circumstances are that the measure is necessary to protect human, animal
8See GATT Article III:2.
9Specifically, it would be covered under GATT Article III:4.
10This is GATT Article I, which complements GATT Article III.
11The Enabling Clause (1979). Differential and more favorable treatment reciprocity and fuller participation of
developing countries, Decision of the GATT Contracting Parties of November 28 (L/4903), para. 3(a).
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or plant life or health, or that it relates to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources (if
such measures are applied in conjunction with restrictions on domestic production or con-
sumption).12 Analysts generally believe that it is easier to pass the latter test, given the need to
prove necessity in the former (de Cendra 2006; Horn and Mavroidis 2011). In fact, past
dispute panels have defined clean air as an exhaustible natural resource and interpreted
“relates to” as implying a reasonable relationship or connection between the measure and
the conservation of the resource in question (i.e., between the means and the ends).13
According to these interpretations, any BCA must demonstrate that it actually addresses
climate change—that the means (the BCA) has a close connection to the ends (mitigating
carbon emissions). Thus any different treatment for different countries must be justified with
a strong environmental rationale.
If a BCA regime is deemed eligible for an exemption, then it must also conform to the
GATT’s chapeau requirement,14 which requires that any breach of GATT obligations be
justified by the desired end—in this case, addressing climate change by preventing carbon
leakage—and that implementation of the measure—in this case, the BCA—is neither arbi-
trary nor carried out in a way that is aimed at protecting domestic interests vis-a-vis foreign
producers.15 Case law also indicates that a BCA may be difficult to implement unless good
faith attempts to reach a multilateral solution to the problem of carbon leakage have already
been made.16
Subsidies and Countervailing Measures
The WTO Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM Agreement) disci-
plines the use of subsidies to domestic producers and delineates permissible responses to
imports that are subsidized in violation of the agreement. The SCM Agreement prohibits any
subsidies that are conditioned on the export of goods,17 and therefore may limit the ability to
apply BCA to exports (de Cendra 2006). Because the SCM Agreement is separate from the
GATT, the General Exceptions do not apply, which means prohibited subsidies cannot be
justified using the environmental protection rationale.
Although the GATT allows BTA for both imports and exports, meaning that value-added
tax adjustments are not considered subsidies, the treatment of an export adjustment of a
carbon tax remains an open legal question. The answer depends on whether a carbon tax is
considered to be a direct tax (on a factor of production, like payroll taxes) or an indirect tax
(on consumption, like a VAT). Following the GATT Working Party on Border Adjustment
12These refer to GATT Article XX, subparagraphs (b) and (g), respectively. The third test is that the measure
conform to the chapeau of Article XX, which we discuss later.
13See US – Gasoline (para. 6.37) and US – Shrimp (AB) (para. 141), respectively.
14The introductory clause of Article XX.
15In Brazil – Retreaded Tyres, a Brazilian import ban was ruled unjustifiable discrimination because it
contained an exception that allowed significant imports of the environmentally problematic used tires.
Similarly, in EU Seals, the EU provided an exception to its import ban on seal products that was aimed at
benefiting indigenous hunters rather than justifying the ban based on the legitimate objective of public
morals (Article XX(a)).
16In US – Shrimp, the United States did not attempt to negotiate turtle conservation agreements with other
countries before imposing the import ban, even though protection of a migratory species is inherently an
international challenge that demands international cooperation.
17See SCM Agreement Article 3.1(a).
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(1970) guidance, if a carbon tax is considered to be a direct tax, then adjusting at the point of
export would constitute a prohibited export subsidy.18 But if it is considered an indirect tax,
then such adjustment would be legal. The GATT Working Party could not reach consensus on
whole categories of taxes—including taxes on inputs to the production process, like machin-
ery, advertising, or energy—and a carbon tax likely falls into this legal grey area.
One could argue, however, that carbon taxes are not direct taxes. Under the SCM
Agreement, direct taxes are defined as “taxes on wages, profits, interests, rents, royalties,
and all other forms of income, and taxes on the ownership of real property”19 and indirect
taxes are defined as “sales, excise, turnover, value added, franchise, stamp, transfer, inventory
and equipment taxes, border taxes and all taxes other than direct taxes and import charges”
(emphasis added). If we accept, based on these definitions, that a carbon tax is not a direct tax,
then it is an indirect tax and therefore adjustable (Maruyama 2011; Hillman 2013; Pauwelyn
2013).
Thus export adjustment may be permissible in conjunction with a carbon tax, subject to
one more prohibition of the SCM agreement: If the export adjustment is in excess of the tax
levied domestically, then it is clearly a prohibited export subsidy.20 On the other hand, if the
BCA accompanies an ETS, the legal questions are straightforward: Because there is no pro-
vision in WTO law for border rebates of regulatory costs, export rebates in the context of a
BCA-ETS regime would very likely be considered prohibited export subsidies.
Guidance for Designing and Implementing BCA
The economic and legal literatures just summarized offer important insights for designing
and implementing BCAs in practice. In this section, we provide guidance for implementing
BCA by examining key design issues, from the objective to eligibility to determining the
adjustments. We highlight the design choices that are best suited to meeting the sometimes
competing objectives of environmental effectiveness (reducing carbon leakage) and consis-
tency with international legal obligations, as well as administrative feasibility.21 For each
issue, we also highlight research gaps.
The Objective
Policymakers may have different objectives for implementing BCA: primary among them,
preventing carbon leakage, maintaining industrial competitiveness, and/or encouraging
other countries to adopt policies to reduce GHG emissions.22 As discussed in the legal context
section, any BCA regime would likely have to justify itself under GATT’s General Exceptions
18See SCM Annex I: Illustrative List of Export Subsidies, item (e).
19Ibid., fn. 58.
20Ibid., item (g).
21Moore (2011) also includes a political feasibility condition, that domestic and foreign firms support (or do
not object to) the combined climate and BCA policy.
22For example, the U.S. Climate Leadership Council proposal aims to use BCA to “protect American com-
petitiveness and punish free-riding by other nations, encouraging them to adopt carbon pricing of their
own” (Baker et al. 2017).
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provisions, and the grounds for such an exception do not include preserving competitiveness,
even if addressing competitiveness could smooth the way for more stringent climate policy.
The economic literature has explored with interest using trade sanctions to enforce par-
ticipation in a carbon pricing coalition (e.g., Lessman, Marschinski, and Edenhofer 2009;
Irfanoglu, Sesmero, and Golub 2015; Nordhaus 2015). However, this leverage objective also
faces legal problems. Sanctions in excess of domestic carbon payments would be seen as
discrimination. But the effectiveness of BCA in enforcing compliance may be limited; export
streams represent a fraction of total country-level production within EITE sectors, and an
even smaller share of the broader economy, which means the costs to exporters are unlikely to
outweigh their costs of joining a carbon pricing regime (Weitzel, Hübler, and Peterson 2012).
Rather than complying, targeted countries may prefer to retaliate against BCA with counter-
vailing tariffs. However, major EITE producers such as China and Russia may have sufficient
incentive to adopt abatement targets, thus reducing the global cost of climate policies
(Böhringer, Carbone and Rutherford 2016).
While BCA can legitimately take aim at producer practices, using BCA to encourage adop-
tion of specific measures (like cap and trade) at the national level or climate policy cooper-
ation at the international level would undoubtedly conflict with CBDR. Such leverage would
likely constitute arbitrary discrimination under GATT’s exceptions provisions because meas-
ures tied to country-level policies will punish all producers from targeted countries, regard-
less of their individual environmental performance. Furthermore, BCA is sufficiently divisive
as to risk hindering efforts to achieve multilateral climate cooperation, particularly if wielded
as leverage.23 Thus the only objective for BCA that is consistent with WTO rules is reducing
carbon emissions.
Policies Eligible for Adjustment
Fundamentally, BCA requires importers to pay for the carbon embodied in their products,
that is, the emissions associated with their production. Abatement may reduce these emis-
sions, but abatement costs are not adjustable. The only domestic policies that offer “like”
treatment of domestic and imported products are price-based climate policies. Such policies
require payments for embodied emissions and offer a clear carbon price on which to base the
adjustments. Non-price-based policies may encourage abatement, but they do not require
that producers pay for the remaining embodied carbon. Therefore BCA cannot be used in
conjunction with performance standards or other nonprice regulations.24
Products Eligible for Adjustment
Which sectors should have their products border adjusted? Economic studies generally ex-
amine either comprehensive BCA (applied to all products and supply chains) or BCA aimed
23The intense controversy surrounding the EU’s aviation emissions levy testifies to that, as do a number of
WTO disputes over unilateral extrajurisdictional action.
24To illustrate, performance standards may set a maximum emissions intensity, but they do not charge for all
emissions. Such standards are a less efficient version of tradable performance standards, which implicitly
combine a price on emissions with a subsidy to output that is equal to the value of the per-unit emissions
allocation. The subsidy on average negates the embodied emissions charge, so nothing remains to be
adjusted, especially since like treatment requires that any subsidies afforded domestic products must
also be offered to imports.
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only at EITE sectors. No studies have addressed the issue of where, precisely, to draw the line
for eligibility. In practice, most BCA proposals have focused on energy-intensive sectors
(e.g., the American Clean Energy and Security Act, allocation approaches in California and
the EU), although broader coverage has advocates in certain policy circles (Baker et al.
2017).
Several factors suggest that narrow coverage is best. First, the chances of meeting
GATT’s exceptions requirements are jeopardized if a BCA’s protection for domestic
sectors goes beyond what can be justified by environmental objectives. Second, studies
show that the majority of leakage mitigation benefits are obtained when BCA is applied
only to the major EITE sectors (Böhringer, Carbone, and Rutherford 2012). Moreover,
the administrative costs of applying BCA to sectors with low leakage risk are large relative
to the carbon reduction benefits, and including goods with long, complex supply chains
makes preventing transshipment difficult (discussed later). Finally, a broad application of
BCA to all products and all embodied emissions shifts the burden of climate policies even
more toward developing countries, without greatly improving (and possibly even de-
creasing) cost-effectiveness (Böhringer, Carbone, and Rutherford 2018), which runs
counter to CBDR.
Narrow coverage requires identifying the sectors (and hence products) that are at the
greatest risk of leakage. Eligibility should rest on a combination of two criteria: carbon
exposure and trade exposure. First, would the carbon price substantially raise production
costs in the sector? Ideally, such cost exposure would be calculated as the CO2 intensity
(e.g., tons of GHG emitted by the sector per unit of value added) multiplied by the
projected emissions tax or allowance price. Second, would trade competition impede
the ability to pass those cost increases on to consumers and cause substitution to unregu-
lated products? Trade intensity—measured as the value of imports and exports in the
sector relative to total production plus imports—is a commonly used but imperfect proxy
for trade sensitivity. In practice, variants of these criteria have been used to justify pref-
erential treatment. The American Clean Energy and Security Act used thresholds of 5
percent energy or CO2 intensive (energy costs generally being a weaker hurdle) and 15
percent trade intensive. By way of comparison, phase 3 of the EU ETS used less stringent
criteria for free allowance allocation, essentially allowing coverage of firms that were trade
exposed without also being GHG intensive, with a resulting 175 products designated
vulnerable to leakage.25 California uses similar metrics but assigns different levels of
leakage risk, phasing out allocation more quickly for lower levels; they identified 16
sectors as high risk (trade intensity greater than 19 percent), 13 as medium, and 3 as
low (trade intensity less than 10 percent).26 The EU is taking a similar approach in phase 4,
reducing the carbon leakage list to about 50 sectors.27
252014/746/EU: Commission Decision of 27 October 2014 determining, pursuant to Directive 2003/87/EC of
the European Parliament and of the Council, a list of sectors and subsectors which are deemed to be
exposed to a significant risk of carbon leakage, for the period 2015 to 2019.
26See Table 8-1 of Cap-and-Trade Regulation 95870(a). https://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/capandtrade/finalreg-
order.pdf.
27https://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/ets/revision_en.
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Because rent-seeking firms will try to ensure their BCA eligibility, the criteria for selecting
eligible products must be fixed and transparent. The appropriateness of the common criteria
for evaluating leakage remains an important research gap (Fowlie and Reguant 2018). For
example, the trade literature offers methods for estimating trade sensitivities (elasticities)
(Hillberry and Hummels 2013), but such estimates are rarely calculated at the level of dis-
aggregation needed for policy analysis. Fischer and Fox (2018) do so and find significant
differences in import sensitivity among EITE subsectors compared with their aggregates.
Fowlie and Reguant (2018) find similar estimates for imports but higher estimates for
exports. Sato et al. (2015) assess the performance of leakage indicators for UK and
German firms and find that carbon intensity (relative to gross value added) is a robust metric,
but that within-sector heterogeneity makes the trade intensity criterion a poor measure of
ability to pass through carbon costs. To assess vulnerability to carbon leakage, Martin et al.
(2014) combine managerial interviews with economic performance data and find that most
EU ETS sectors are overcompensated, suggesting that policymakers overestimate leakage.
Fowlie, Reguant, and Ryan (2016) undertake a first attempt to compare econometric esti-
mates of leakage rates with trade and energy intensity indicators and conclude that leakage
risk increases with both in combination; that is, sectors with high energy intensity but low
trade intensity exhibit low leakage risk.
In sum, the literature highlights the importance of requiring sectors to meet criteria for
both trade and carbon exposure. Initial findings provide some support for using the simple
trade intensity proxy rather than, say, empirical estimates of trade sensitivity, which are
difficult to standardize (Fowlie, Reguant, and Ryan 2016; Fischer and Fox 2018). Finally,
given the low carbon prices in most markets, and that even carbon-intensive industries do not
face significant leakage risk if carbon prices are low, the measure of carbon exposure should be
more than simply carbon or energy intensity, rather it should be an appropriate cost exposure
threshold. Future research could help identify where those thresholds lie.
Embodied Emissions
Once a product is deemed eligible for BCA, a methodology is needed for calculating its
emissions content. The system boundary defines what emissions in the product’s life cycle
are included in the BCA calculation. We identify three categories or “scopes” of emissions.28
Which ones should be included inside the system boundary depends on how significant the
inclusion of those GHG emissions would be, whether the GHG emissions are already
accounted for within another sector, and the feasibility of collecting robust data. We then
consider methods for measuring emissions within those scopes.
Scope 1 emissions are direct emissions from a given product’s production process. Scope 2
emissions are indirect emissions associated with energy use (electricity, steam or heat generated
offsite and purchased). Such emissions can represent the majority of emissions from pro-
cesses such as metal smelting, and a significant share of total GHG emissions from sectors like
steel and cement. Scope 3 emissions are any indirect production-related emissions that are not
covered by scope 2, such as emissions that are embodied in inputs (like steel in machines) or
28The definitions of scope 1, 2, and 3 emissions here are taken directly from the GHG Protocol. See www.
ghgprotocol.org.
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even downstream activities like transportation or waste disposal. Calculating these emissions
is complex (particularly for imports), requiring data that often is not readily available, and
could suffer from problems of double counting or the inclusion of emissions not covered in
the domestic scheme (e.g., the EU ETS does not cover entire supply chains).
Scope 1 emissions are always included in the system boundary. Due to their complexity and
relatively small share of emissions for EITE industries, scope 3 emissions are best excluded
from the system boundary. There is no consensus on the extent to which manufacturers
should be responsible for reducing these supply-chain emissions. The leakage associated with
pricing scope 2 emissions, however, can warrant covering them under a BCA regime and thus
including them in the system boundary (Bednar-Friedl, Schinko, and Steininger 2012).
To avoid violating GATT’s national treatment principle, any emissions not covered in the
domestic regulation must not be included in the system boundary for BCA.
Once the system boundary is set, benchmark emissions (i.e., measured or default emissions
content) must be determined for each scope that is included. Such an exercise may have already
been conducted for domestic sources for the allocation of emission allowances. However, BCA
requires a determination for foreign sources. Should actual emissions data or a sectorwide
benchmark be used? This decision involves trade-offs between firm incentives, industry incen-
tives, gathering data, compliance costs, and WTO obligations. To date, the economics literature
offers little guidance concerning this decision. Exporting firms have an incentive to decrease
their emissions only if doing so lowers their BCA payments, that is, if actual emissions are used
to calculate the adjustment. On the other hand, using firm-specific data opens the possibility of
reshuffling emissions, that is, the market could simply reallocate the lowest-carbon production
for export to carbon-regulating countries while higher-carbon production remains for unregu-
lated consumption. This trade-off needs further attention in the literature. Collecting credible
firm-level data is costly and requires third-party verification; mandating that foreign producers
bear these costs could be considered an unacceptable trade barrier. For these reasons, default
sector-based benchmark emissions must be used. However, allowing producers to provide
third-party-verified firm-level data on emissions intensity (and using the same system bound-
aries that are used for implementing country producers) would improve the odds of a BCA
scheme being found legal under GATT’s exceptions provisions.
In setting the emissions benchmark, three choices must be made. The first concerns the bench-
mark level. A high benchmark—such as worst available technology—risks appearing punitive and
involves the trade-offs of using firm-specific data (discussed earlier). A low benchmark—such as
best available technology or average emissions of a clean importer—may require no foreign data,
but it provides little incentive for improvement and less protection against leakage.
The second choice concerns the number of benchmarks to set for a given product. As noted
earlier, international trade law considers identical commodities that are produced in different
ways as “like,” which means they require similar treatment (i.e., a single benchmark).
However, some products have multiple production processes with different emissions in-
tensities (e.g., steel can be made from iron ore using a blast furnace or from scrap steel using
an electric arc furnace), suggesting that multiple benchmarks may be appropriate.
The third choice is whether the benchmark should differentiate among exporters based on
country-specific variables. Data for exporting countries may not be readily available or
verifiable, and gathering such data may be an arduous task. Moreover, country-specific
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benchmarks may conflict with GATT’s MFN provisions and would require provisions to
prevent transshipment from countries assigned higher-intensity benchmarks.29
Uniform benchmarks, such as those based on importing country characteristics, are simple
to calculate and avoid problems of discrimination, but they are less able to accurately reflect the
actual emissions intensity. A hybrid benchmark—using a uniform benchmark (such as average
implementing country practice) for scope 1 emissions and a country-specific benchmark for
scope 2 emissions—could balance the trade-offs between accuracy, incentives, and legal issues.
Such a system is effective at preventing leakage because it allows the more stringent benchmark
to focus only on the scope with the most potential for regional variation (scope 2). Meanwhile,
it avoids the data challenges of firm-specific scope 1 emissions, which generally have less var-
iation, since production processes are fairly similar across countries (International Energy
Agency 2007). A hybrid scheme of this type would still face GATT MFN problems, but the
hybrid benchmark’s use of country-specific estimates for scope 2 emissions has a legitimate
environmental rationale, which is important for a GATT exception. Otherwise it may be dif-
ficult to differentiate adjustment levels based on the country of origin rather than doing so at the
level of individual producers based on their environmental performance.30
Compatibility with WTO rules may also be enhanced by adhering to international stand-
ards and protocols where available, both for data submission and benchmark creation. For
example, Cohen and Vandenbergh (2012) argue that international standards that emerge
informally through voluntary carbon footprint labeling might form a basis for formal pro-
cedures to determine emissions benchmarks. Avoiding duplicative exercises can also reduce
compliance costs. Finally, to counter the negative impact of the compliance costs associated
with an involuntary scheme, implementing states should offer support—in the form of
financial and technical assistance for accounting, reporting, and verification—to assist for-
eign covered exporters in submitting verified individual data.
Nevertheless, the economic trade-offs among the various emissions calculations merit
further study. In particular, carbon leakage models to date have largely ignored within-
sector emissions heterogeneity, making it difficult to estimate the potential for emissions
reshuffling versus reductions driven by more firm-specific measures.
The Adjustment Price
After determining the embodied emissions calculation, one must then establish a carbon
price and compliance method for the BCA. If firms in the implementing country are regulated
with a carbon tax, that should be the basis for the price charged to the exporting country’s
firms. If the implementing country uses cap and trade, importers could be required to
29Special benchmarks could be developed for LDCs in order to respect the principle of CBDR. The importing
country could assume, for example, that all imports from LDCs have used best available technology.
However, this modification has no environmental rationale, and would thus likely fail the GATT exception
tests.
30In US – Shrimp, because the regulations certified imports on a country-by-country basis rather than a
producer-by-producer basis, the import ban was ultimately applied to fishers that may have actually used
the required equipment. The appellate body ruled that this showed a disconnect between the measure and
the environmental objective. In the same vein, it may be illegal to assign foreign producers benchmark
values for GHG intensity if domestic producers are allowed to avoid a benchmark by providing actual
values; foreign producers should also be allowed this opportunity (US – Gasoline).
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purchase allowances to cover their emissions or pay a fee based on the market price of
allowances. Alternatively, one could allow importers or foreign producers to purchase inter-
national carbon offsets (e.g., certified emissions reductions) up to the determined value of the
adjustment. To avoid problems of unpredictable swings in price, importers should be
afforded the same compliance timeframe as domestic firms, or the BCA price should be set
on a regular and infrequent basis (e.g., annually, based on a rolling average of previous
periods of measurement). In sum, the BCA price and compliance mechanism should adhere
as closely as possible to the terms faced by domestic firms. Any unfavorable treatment of
foreign firms risks violating GATT’s national treatment provisions and could only be upheld
under GATT’s exception provisions.
Other Foreign and Domestic Policy Measures
In order to ensure comparable treatment, BCA design must also account for carbon payments
made by foreign firms in their home countries. Not granting such credit to foreign firms
would likely lead to a finding that the BCA regime is arbitrary in its application and not
primarily aimed at environmental objectives, and thus in violation of GATT’s exception
provisions. Ideally the BCA would offset the differential between foreign and domestic
price-based climate policies.31 Of course, if the foreign system has a different compliance
mechanism or system boundary than the domestic system, this adjustment may require more
than simply calculating the difference in carbon tax rates.
A BCA system must also recognize any free allowances or other compensatory mechanisms
enjoyed by domestic firms and offer comparable benefits to imports covered by the BCA. In
some cases, the BCA level may need to be adjusted down to zero. Generally BCA should not be
combined with other cost compensation behind the border (i.e., applied to domestic prod-
ucts) because such compensation would undermine the case for a GATT exception. For
symmetry, adjustment for foreign carbon prices must account for free allocation abroad.
Exemptions
An alternative to adjusting the BCA based on country-specific factors is the provision of a
wholesale exemption, which is equivalent to modifying the emissions benchmark to zero.
Exemptions based on a measure of climate action by the trading partner are commonly
considered for a BCA regime. Note that such measures risk being viewed as attempts to exert
leverage over trading partners, which is inconsistent with the legally acceptable objectives
under GATT (discussed earlier). Indeed, case law suggests that it may be illegal to demand
specific policies as a basis for exemption from BCA rather than requiring that the exporter
achieve some given level of climate performance.32 Country-based exemptions also have the
potential to unfairly discriminate among exporters and may thus be incompatible with the
GATT’s MFN requirements. Nevertheless, the exemption might be justified under GATT’s
exception provisions if it contributes to protecting the environment.
31For the same reasons that BCA should not be allowed for sectors or products that are regulated with non-
price-based policies, such policies in the foreign country should not generate adjustments to the BCA.
32The appellate body in US – Shrimp ruled against the U.S. law for demanding that foreign shrimp fishers use
exactly the same equipment as U.S. fishers to avoid the incidental capture of turtles.
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We consider five possible exemptions:
1. Exempting countries that implement a national emissions cap. An effective national cap
theoretically precludes leakage (even if emissions rise in EITE sectors). This exemption
would likely be allowed under GATT’s exception requirements because of the strong
relationship between the defining national characteristic (an emissions cap) and the
environmental objective (preventing leakage). However, many emissions caps are not
strict, thus allowing for leakage (e.g., use of overcredited offsets for compliance, low price
ceilings, caps that are not economy-wide, or lack of enforcement).
2. Exempting countries that take “adequate” national actions other than national caps. This
exemption faces the challenge of defining ex ante what constitutes “adequate” action. For
price-based mechanisms, exemptions are a much blunter instrument than adjusting for
a carbon tax or allowance price in the calculation of the BCA. We have also argued that
non-price-based mechanisms should not be eligible for border adjustment because their
cost burdens are nontransparent and embodied emissions remain unpriced, therefore
the case for exempting them is unclear. In any case, any national climate regime other
than a hard cap is susceptible to leakage.
On the other hand, when the implementing country is party to a multilateral agree-
ment on climate change—which could be interpreted as international recognition of
“adequate” national actions—not using this exemption may violate GATT’s exception
provisions concerning arbitrary treatment of exporting countries. However, this is a grey
area because the Paris Agreement relies on NDCs rather than negotiated targets, and thus
it could be argued that there is no clear consensus on “adequacy” of national actions.
3. Exempting sectors from countries that implement a sectoral cap. If a country effectively caps
a given sector’s emissions, no sector-level leakage will occur. This exemption probably
faces no trade law issues concerning MFN because the discrimination is based on sector
(not country) characteristics. Adjustments for sectoral carbon pricing (or export taxes)
could also be included in the BCA calculations.
4. Exempting least developed countries and low-income countries. An exemption for least
developed countries and low-income countries would help the measure align with the
UNFCCC principle of CBDR and the WTO principle of special and differential treat-
ment. However, very few of these countries export the type of EITE goods targeted by
BCA. Moreover, this exemption creates problems with MFN treatment, which exempts
only tariff treatment intended to aid development in the target countries.
5. Exempting countries by means of administrative flexibility. For example, exempting coun-
tries that have very minor (i.e., de minimus) trade in covered goods could lower ad-
ministrative costs. Other, broader public policy objectives might motivate exemptions.
However, such exemptions would conflict with the GATT’s MFN provisions and may
lack the predictability that should be the hallmark of any scheme.
Given these considerations, exemptions should be incorporated into a BCA regime with
caution. They may be useful if they are administratively simpler mechanisms than BCA
modifications for avoiding double charging (e.g., where covered sectors operate under a
credible hard emissions cap in the exporting country, or where carbon prices are harmonized)
or for aligning with CBDR goals.
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It is also important to note that any differentiation based on the country of origin raises
transshipment problems. Strong provisions would be required to ensure that any products
coming from the preferentially treated country have undergone a substantial transformation
there. Otherwise, countries facing high adjustments could ship products to low-adjustment
or exempted countries for reexport to avoid being covered by the BCA. Transshipment
provisions work best when the goods in question are wholly obtained in a single country
or at least have a very simple supply chain. This bolsters the argument made earlier for
maintaining a narrow scope of coverage that precludes all but a small number of
commodity-oriented EITE goods.
Export Adjustments
Until this point we have focused on designing BCA for imports. True destination-based (or
consumption-based) carbon pricing would also make border adjustments for exports. Export
adjustment would offer a rebate to domestically produced products that are exported, with
the rebate being equivalent to the products’ embodied carbon payments. Adjustment for
exports would allow such products to compete on a level playing field with unregulated
products in foreign markets, thus avoiding leakage from loss of market share in third-country
markets. Export adjustment could also help avoid the issue of double taxation when the
products are shipped to a destination country that also applies BCA to its imports.
The literature is mixed on the effectiveness of export adjustments. A meta-analysis by
Branger and Quirion (2014b) found that export adjustment played an important role in
reducing leakage. However, studies comparing the effects directly find that most of the
leakage reduction from BCA can be captured by a scheme that contains only import adjust-
ments (Böhringer, Balistreri, and Rutherford 2012; Fischer and Fox 2012b). This finding
holds only for countries that are heavy net importers of BCA-eligible goods.
Note that the American Clean Energy and Security Act and the 2010 French proposal for a
carbon inclusion mechanism focused on adjustment for imports only, but the Climate
Leadership Council carbon tax proposal includes export adjustment. In the end, practical
challenges may prevail against export adjustment. As noted earlier, the legal status of BCA for
exports is uncertain under WTO law. Moreover, BCA for exports is difficult to reconcile with
an approach that carves out exemptions from import adjustment.
The Use of Revenues
The final design choice concerns the use of revenues collected from a BCA for imports. The
disposition of these revenues has a substantial impact on the international distribution of a
climate policy’s economic effects, as well as on the perception of BCA.
Economic analyses show that when countries that implement BCA retain the revenues, more of
the burden of the climate policy package shifts toward developing countries; alternatively, ded-
icating the revenues to benefit the exporting countries can avoid this shift or even make exporting
countries better off (Böhringer, Balistreri, and Rutherford 2012; Fischer and Fox 2012a).
Dedicating the revenues toward objectives that assist developing countries serves two
purposes. First, it respects the principles of CBDR. Second, it demonstrates that the purpose
of the BCA is to avoid leakage and not to provide protection for domestic producers. For
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example, revenues could be refunded to the exporting country directly or via clean technol-
ogy transfer. The implementing country could earmark the revenues to internationally ad-
ministered funds for climate change mitigation and/or adaptation or disburse them for
mitigation and adaptation projects. Any of these options would likely improve a BCA
regime’s chance of success in meeting GATT’s exception requirements by helping to dem-
onstrate the BCA’s environmental objectives.
Ensuring that the revenues are not retained by the importing country also removes do-
mestic incentives to manipulate the terms of the adjustment in order to enhance national
welfare in a beggar-thy-neighbor fashion. For all these reasons, BCA proceeds should not be
dedicated to general revenues in the implementing country. For jurisdictions that discourage
or prohibit earmarking of tax revenues to specific purposes, a package of foreign assistance
measures together with the BCA could help demonstrate good faith.
Summary and Conclusions
Placing carbon pricing at the center of climate policy is widely accepted to be the most cost-
effective way to reduce GHG emissions. The effectiveness of carbon pricing, however, can be
undermined by international trade: goods, capital, and energy flow across markets that have
different climate policies, which can lead to carbon leakage. Addressing carbon leakage can thus
make national climate policy more effective. Among the unilateral options to address leakage,
BCA may be the most efficient, but also the most controversial and legally challenging.
This article has highlighted best practices in the design and implementation of BCA, based on
interdisciplinary research to date. Another purpose of this article has been to warn policymakers
considering BCA about just how difficult it is to get it right. Several elements of the design
described here—for example, the setting of product benchmarks—are long-term, complex,
and administratively costly undertakings, and numerous interests will lobby for access to and
influence over the process. While not deciding arguments, these considerations need to be part of
the deliberation when policymakers weigh BCA against other options for addressing leakage.
We have shown here that many of the most important welfare effects of BCA, both domes-
tically and for trade partners, inherently depend on assumptions about specific design choices,
which could influence conclusions about the costs and benefits of BCA. Nevertheless, impor-
tant research gaps remain regarding many of the practical and legal issues associated with BCA.
Research priorities should include, for example, a more rigorous examination of the hetero-
geneities within industries that are relevant for measuring emissions intensity and assessing
benchmarks and impacts. Another research priority is developing better measures of leakage
risk. In addition, most CGE models lack the capacity to assess the substitutability of nonenergy
inputs, which is an important margin for reducing the consumption of carbon-intensive
commodities—and for setting the policy scope. More rigorous research in these areas would
also be helpful for the design of behind-the-border options for addressing leakage.
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